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This paper presents research conducted within the Macroprudential Research Network (MaRs). The network is composed of econo-
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pean Central Bank. The objective of MaRs is to develop core conceptual frameworks, models and/or tools supporting macro-prudential 
supervision in the EU. 
The research is carried out in three work streams:
1. Macro-ﬁ  nancial models linking ﬁ  nancial stability and the performance of the economy;
2.  Early warning systems and systemic risk indicators;
3.  Assessing contagion risks.
MaRs is chaired by Philipp Hartmann (ECB). Paolo Angelini (Banca d’Italia), Laurent Clerc (Banque de France), Carsten Detken 
(ECB) and Katerina Šmídková (Czech National Bank) are workstream coordinators. Xavier Freixas (Universitat Pompeu Fabra) acts 
as external consultant and Angela Maddaloni (ECB) as Secretary.
The refereeing process of this paper has been coordinated by a team composed of Cornelia Holthausen, Kalin Nikolov and Bernd 
Schwaab (all ECB). 
The paper is released in order to make the research of MaRs generally available, in preliminary form, to encourage comments and sug-
gestions prior to ﬁ  nal publication. The views expressed in the paper are the ones of the author(s) and do not necessarily reﬂ  ect those 
of the ECB or of the ESCB. 3
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Using the 2007-2009 financial crisis as a laboratory, we analyze the transmission of 
crises to country-industry equity portfolios in 55 countries. We use an asset pricing 
framework with global and local factors to predict crisis returns, defining 
unexplained increases in factor loadings as indicative of contagion. We find 
evidence of systematic contagion from US markets and from the global financial 
sector, but the effects are very small. By contrast, there has been systematic and 
substantial contagion from domestic equity markets to individual domestic equity 
portfolios, with its severity inversely related to the quality of countries’ economic 
fundamentals and policies. Consequently, we reject the globalization hypothesis 
that links the transmission of the crisis to the extent of global exposure. Instead, we 
confirm the old “wake-up call” hypothesis, with markets and investors focusing 
substantially more on idiosyncratic, country-specific characteristics during the 
crisis. 
 
JEL codes: F3, G14, G15. 
Keywords: contagion; financial crisis; equity markets; global transmission; market 








The financial crisis of 2007-09 has arguably been the first truly major global crisis since the 
Great Depression of 1929-32. While the crisis initially had its origin in the United States in a 
relatively small segment of the lending market, the sub-prime mortgage market, it rapidly 
spread across virtually all economies, both advanced and emerging, as well as across economic 
sectors. It also affected equity markets worldwide, with many countries experiencing even 
sharper equity market crashes than the United States, making it an ideal laboratory to revisit 
the debate about the presence and sources of “contagion” in equity markets. 
 
This article studies how and why the crisis spread so violently across countries and economic 
sectors. We develop a three-factor asset-pricing model to set a benchmark for what global 
equity market co-movements should expected to be, based on existing fundamentals. This 
model distinguishes between a US-specific factor, a global financial factor and a domestic 
factor for the pricing of 415 country-sector equity portfolios across 55 countries worldwide, 
covering more than 85% of world equity market capitalization. In our most general 
specification, exposures to the factors may depend on firm-specific characteristics (the degree 
of financing constraints and interest rate exposure, for example), country-specific 
characteristics, measuring either the degree of financial and trade integration or 
macroeconomic and financial fundamentals (current account deficit, political risk, etc.), and 
global risk and liquidity indicators.   
 
We define contagion as the co-movement in excess of that implied by the factor model, i.e. 
above and beyond what can be explained by fundamentals taking into account their natural 
evolution over time. This contrasts with many contagion articles simply comparing co-
movements before and during the crisis. The inclusion of three different factors in our model 
enables us to distinguish between three distinct types of contagion. Contagion may stem from 
the US or from the global financial sector, implying a high co-movement of domestic sector 
portfolios with the US or global factors. We will label these “US contagion” and “global 
contagion”, respectively. Alternatively, while investors may continue to discriminate across 
countries in response to global or US-specific shocks during crises, they may discriminate less 
across stocks within countries in response to idiosyncratic, country-specific shocks, thus giving 
rise to what we call “domestic contagion”. 
 
Moreover, our framework allows us not only to test for the presence of different types of 
contagion but also to disentangle the channels of contagion by testing whether and how the 
factor exposures to the various instruments change during the crisis. In particular, we 
distinguish between two alternative hypotheses. The first hypothesis, or what we call the 
“globalization hypothesis”, implies that contagion during crises hits hardest those economies 
that are highly integrated globally, such as through trade and financial linkages. The alternative 
hypothesis, or what we refer to as the “wake-up call hypothesis”, states that a crisis initially 
restricted to one market segment or country provides new information that may prompt 
investors to reassess the vulnerability of other market segments or countries, which spreads the 
crisis across markets and borders (Goldstein, 1998; Masson, 1999; Goldstein, Kaminsky and 
Reinhart, 2000).  Under this hypothesis, domestic fundamentals are likely to play a dominant 
role in the transmission of the crisis. Another possibility is that contagion occurs without 
discrimination at all, driven by herding behavior or investors’ risk appetite beyond the effect of 
fundamentals, or at least unrelated to observable fundamentals.   
 6
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Overall we find statistically significant but economically small evidence of systematic 
contagion from US markets and the global financial sector to equity markets in the 55 countries 
of our sample during the 2007-09 financial crisis. By contrast, we find strong evidence of 
domestic contagion: the co-movement of portfolios within a country increased systematically 
during the crisis, above and beyond what can be accounted for by underlying fundamentals. 
Such contagion from domestic markets appears to have been present in all regions and for most 
sectors. Moreover, domestic contagion has been large, with betas with respect to the domestic 
factor portfolio increasing on average by 50%. Taken together, the evidence thus suggests that 
contagion during the 2007-09 financial crisis was mostly domestic in nature and did not stem 
systematically from the United States or the global banking sector. 
 
This finding of the importance of domestic contagion for the global transmission of the 2007-
09 crisis is robust to several alternative model specifications and sensitivity tests. Interestingly, 
this feature seems quite specific to the 2007-09 crisis, as there is no evidence that domestic 
contagion played a role in past crises, such as the 1998 LTCM crisis or the 2000-02 bust of the 
TMT bubble. 
 
A further striking feature of the crisis has been the high degree of heterogeneity in contagion 
across country-sector equity portfolios. While, overall, there is only limited contagion from US 
markets or the global financial sector, some of the individual equity portfolios have 
experienced substantial contagion from these markets during the financial crisis. Studying the 
transmission channels during the financial crisis provides further insights. The globalization 
hypothesis is clearly rejected: differences in external exposure instruments – such as trade 
openness, or financial depth, do not explain contagion. Neither do firm-specific determinants, 
such as the degree of financial constraints, the exchange rate exposure or the interest rate 
exposure of firms. Risk indicators matter in normal times, but the extreme co-movements 
between various portfolios during the crisis are linked negatively to the evolution of risk 
indicators. Instead, we find that countries with poor macroeconomic fundamentals, high 
sovereign risk and poor institutions experienced by far the largest equity market declines and 
contagion. In particular the size of FX reserves, the current account position and the sovereign 
rating of countries are three of the factors that exerted a highly significant and economically 
sizeable effect on the overall equity market performance of countries in the crisis.  
 
This evidence in support of the wake-up call hypothesis opens up the intriguing possibility that 
government policy can mitigate contagion. If macro-fundamentals matter so much during a 
crisis, cross-country differences in government policy may explain the relative exposure to the 
crisis. Therefore we study the role of various financial policies introduced during the crisis 
(debt and deposit guarantees and capital injections). We find that the introduction of debt 
guarantees and deposit guarantees during the crisis helped insulate domestic equity markets to 
an economically and statistically significant extent from the impact of the crisis, through 
reducing the exposures to global, US and domestic factors. For instance, the introduction or 
extension of debt or deposit guarantees during the crisis reduced the exposure of equity 
portfolios to the global factor by more than 30% compared to the global factor exposure in 








Ever since the seminal work of King and Wadhwani (1990) following the global October 1987 
stock market crash, the international finance literature has studied how shocks are transmitted 
across borders. Words with negative connotations such as “volatility spillovers” (e.g. Engle, Ito 
and Lin (1990); Masulis, Hamao and Ng (1990)) and “contagion” have been coined to indicate 
shock transmission that could not be explained by fundamentals or co-movements that were 
viewed as “excessive.”  Countless papers have been written proposing quantitative measures of 
contagion (see Dungey et al. (2004) for a survey) or developing theories to explain it (see 
Karolyi (2003) for a survey). 
 
The financial crisis of 2007-09 has arguably been the first truly major global crisis since the 
Great Depression of 1929-32. While the crisis initially had its origin in the United States in a 
relatively small segment of the lending market, the sub-prime mortgage market, it rapidly 
spread across virtually all economies, both advanced and emerging, as well as across economic 
sectors. It also affected equity markets worldwide, with many countries experiencing even 
sharper equity market crashes than the United States, making it an ideal laboratory to revisit 
the debate about the presence and sources of “contagion” in equity markets. 
 
This article studies how and why the crisis spread so violently across countries and economic 
sectors. We develop a three-factor asset-pricing model to set a benchmark for what global 
equity market co-movements should expected to be, based on existing fundamentals. This 
model distinguishes between a US-specific factor, a global financial factor and a domestic 
factor for the pricing of 415 country-sector equity portfolios across 55 countries worldwide, 
covering more than 85% of world equity market capitalization. In our most general 
specification, exposures to the factors may depend on firm-specific characteristics (the degree 
of financing constraints and interest rate exposure, for example), country-specific 
characteristics, measuring either the degree of financial and trade integration or 
macroeconomic and financial fundamentals (current account deficit, political risk, etc.), and 
global risk and liquidity indicators.   
 
We define contagion as the co-movement in excess of that implied by the factor model, i.e. 
above and beyond what can be explained by fundamentals taking into account their natural 
evolution over time. This contrasts with many contagion articles simply comparing co-
movements before and during the crisis. The inclusion of three different factors in our model 
enables us to distinguish between three distinct types of contagion. Contagion may stem from 
the US or from the global financial sector, implying a high co-movement of domestic sector 
portfolios with the US or global factors – and this may result if real and financial linkages to 
the US or the global economy are considered particularly important during a financial crisis or 
because domestic fundamentals are especially vulnerable to global or US shocks during a 
crisis. We will label these “US contagion” and “global contagion”, respectively. Alternatively, 
while investors may continue to discriminate across countries in response to global or US-
specific shocks during crises, they may discriminate less across stocks within countries in 
response to idiosyncratic, country-specific shocks, thus giving rise to what we call “domestic 
contagion”. 
 
Moreover, our framework allows us not only to test for the presence of different types of 
contagion but also to disentangle the channels of contagion by testing whether and how the 
factor exposures to the various instruments change during the crisis. In particular, we 
distinguish between two alternative hypotheses. The first hypothesis, or what we call the 8
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“globalization hypothesis”, implies that contagion during crises hits hardest those economies 
that are highly integrated globally, such as through trade and financial linkages. The alternative 
hypothesis, or what we refer to as the “wake-up call hypothesis”, states that a crisis initially 
restricted to one market segment or country provides new information that may prompt 
investors to reassess the vulnerability of other market segments or countries, which spreads the 
crisis across markets and borders (Goldstein, 1998; Masson, 1999; Goldstein, Kaminsky and 
Reinhart, 2000).
1  Under this hypothesis, domestic fundamentals are likely to play a dominant 
role in the transmission of the crisis. Another possibility is that contagion occurs without 
discrimination at all, driven by herding behavior or investors’ risk appetite beyond the effect of 
fundamentals, or at least unrelated to observable fundamentals.   
 
Overall we find statistically significant but economically small evidence of systematic 
contagion from US markets and the global financial sector to equity markets in the 55 countries 
of our sample during the 2007-09 financial crisis. By contrast, we find strong evidence of 
domestic contagion: the co-movement of portfolios within a country increased systematically 
during the crisis, above and beyond what can be accounted for by underlying fundamentals. 
Such contagion from domestic markets appears to have been present in all regions and for most 
sectors. Moreover, domestic contagion has been large, with betas with respect to the domestic 
factor portfolio increasing on average by 50%. Taken together, the evidence thus suggests that 
contagion during the 2007-09 financial crisis was mostly domestic in nature and did not stem 
systematically from the United States or the global banking sector. 
 
This finding of the importance of domestic contagion for the global transmission of the 2007-
09 crisis is robust to several alternative model specifications and sensitivity tests. Interestingly, 
this feature seems quite specific to the 2007-09 crisis, as there is no evidence that domestic 
contagion played a role in past crises, such as the 1998 LTCM crisis or the 2000-02 bust of the 
TMT bubble. 
 
A further striking feature of the crisis has been the high degree of heterogeneity in contagion 
across country-sector equity portfolios. While, overall, there is only limited contagion from US 
markets or the global financial sector, some of the individual equity portfolios have 
experienced substantial contagion from these markets during the financial crisis. For instance, 
Emerging Europe, which shows relatively limited interdependence with US markets, has seen 
strong contagion from US markets during the crisis. The same holds for some sectors that are 
relatively less integrated with US markets (energy, basic materials), while firms in sectors 
previously highly integrated with US markets, such as technology, experienced a decoupling, 
or “negative” contagion, from US markets during the crisis. A similar pattern, though much 
stronger, is also observed for the distribution of domestic contagion. Strikingly, overall 
contagion and pre-crisis external exposure are negatively correlated. 
 
Studying the transmission channels during the financial crisis provides further insights. The 
globalization hypothesis is clearly rejected: differences in external exposure instruments – such 
as trade openness, or financial depth, do not explain contagion. Neither do firm-specific 
determinants, such as the degree of financial constraints, the exchange rate exposure or the 
interest rate exposure of firms. Risk indicators matter in normal times, but the extreme co-
movements between various portfolios during the crisis are linked negatively to the evolution 
                                                 
1 This term was coined by Goldstein (1998) in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, with the Thai currency crisis 
of 1997 acting as a “wake-up call” for international investors who eventually recognised that the so-called “Asian 
miracle” of the time was rather an “Asian mirage”, which ultimately led to a reassessment of the creditworthiness 
of Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Singapore. 9
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of risk indicators. Instead, we find that countries with poor macroeconomic fundamentals, high 
sovereign risk and poor institutions experienced by far the largest equity market declines and 
contagion. In particular the size of FX reserves, the current account position and the sovereign 
rating of countries are three of the factors that exerted a highly significant and economically 
sizeable effect on the overall equity market performance of countries in the crisis.  
 
This evidence in support of the wake-up call hypothesis opens up the intriguing possibility that 
government policy can mitigate contagion. If macro-fundamentals matter so much during a 
crisis, cross-country differences in government policy may explain the relative exposure to the 
crisis. Therefore we study the role of various financial policies introduced during the crisis 
(debt and deposit guarantees and capital injections) which, in essence, transfer risk on a 
massive scale from individual firms (not just in the financial sector) to governments. We find 
that the introduction of debt guarantees and deposit guarantees during the crisis helped insulate 
domestic equity markets to an economically and statistically significant extent from the impact 
of the crisis, through reducing the exposures to global, US and domestic factors. For instance, 
the introduction or extension of debt or deposit guarantees during the crisis reduced the 
exposure of equity portfolios to the global factor by more than 30% compared to the global 
factor exposure in countries that did not introduce such policies. 
 
Our work contributes mainly to two literatures. First, there is the vast literature on international 
market integration, shock transmission and contagion.  Our approach does not suffer from the 
volatility bias described in the seminal work of Forbes and Rigobon (2002), and owes most to 
the factor model approach in Bekaert, Harvey and Ng (2005), who also define contagion as 
excessive co-movement over and above the predictions of a factor model.  What we add is the 
idea of studying in detail the sources of contagion, allowing us to differentiate several 
economic hypotheses regarding contagion. 
 
Second, our work relates to the growing literature on the 2007-2009 global financial crisis, 
more specifically, to the small, but rapidly growing literature that tries to uncover the drivers of 
transmission of the crisis across firms and markets within the US, including Tong and Wei 
(2009), Almeida et al. (2009) and Diebold and Yilmaz (2010).  
 
Closer to our research, however, is the literature on the transmission of the crisis globally 
through macro and financial channels. Key contemporaneous papers include Tong and Wei 
(forthcoming) who find that the average decline in stock prices during the crisis in a sample of 
4000 firms in 24 emerging countries was more severe for those firms intrinsically more 
dependent on external finance (in particular on bank lending and portfolio flows). In a related 
vein, Stulz and Beltratti (2009) investigate whether the variation in the cross-section of stock 
returns of large banks across the world during the crisis is related to bank-level governance, 
country-level governance, country-level regulation, as well as to bank balance sheet and 
profitability characteristics before the crisis. Eichengreen et al. (2009) find that the global crisis 
significantly increased the importance of common factors in the movements of banks’ credit 
default swap spreads. From a more macro perspective, Rose and Spiegel (forthcoming) find 
limited evidence that international linkages were associated with the incidence of the crisis and 
in particular claim that countries heavily exposed to either U.S. assets or trade behaved 
similarly to other countries. Rose and Spiegel (2010) additionally find that countries with 
current account surpluses were better insulated from the crisis. Frankel and Saravelos (2010) 
find that international reserves and real exchange rate over-valuation are useful leading 
indicators in the 2008-2009 crisis, but their crisis definition involves real economic variables 
and exchange rates in addition to equity markets. Finally, Calomiris, Love and Martinez Peria 10
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(2010) focus on firm-specific “shock factors” which arise as a result of an unexpected crisis 
event and find that credit supply shocks, global demand shocks and selling pressures in the 
equity market had a negative effect on global stock returns during the crisis (August 2007 to 
December 2008) but a positive or insignificant effect during their placebo period (August 2005 
to December 2006). 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the empirical framework, defining 
and distinguishing between market interdependence and contagion. Section 3 contains the 
empirical findings first contrasting how a pure “interdependence” model fares relative to a 
model accommodating “contagion” before analyzing the sources of contagion. Section 4 
summarizes the findings and concludes. 
 
 
2. Empirical framework 
 
This section outlines the model we estimate, contrasts the concepts of interdependence and 
contagion and discusses estimation issues.  
 
 
2.1 The asset-pricing model 
 
We formulate an international factor model with three factors, a US factor, a global financial 






t t R R R F = . The three factors are value-weighted 
market indices, so that the model potentially embeds different CAPMs as special cases:  when 
the betas on the first two factors are zero, the model becomes a domestic CAPM; when the beta 
of the domestic factor is set to zero, the model can act as a World CAPM.
2 The choice of these 
three factors allows studying whether the global dimension of the 2007-09 crisis mainly 
reflected a global financial shock, a shock specific to the US economy that subsequently spread 
globally, or to what extent there was an element of increased vulnerability at the country or 
firm level that spread the crisis.    
 
The full model looks as follows: 
 
t i t t i t t i t i t t i e CR F R E R , 1 , , , 1 , ' ] [ + + + = − − η β     (1) 
t t i k t i i t i CR Z 1 , , 1 0 , , ' − − + + = γ β β β        (2) 
k t i i t i Z − − + = , 1 0 , 1 , ' γ γ γ        ( 3 )  
k t i i t i Z − − + = , 1 0 , 1 , ' η η η            ( 4 )  
 
where Ri,t is the excess return of portfolio i during week t (the return less the three month US 
T-bill rate in weekly units), Et-1[Ri,t] is the expected excess return, measured as a linear 
function of the lagged excess return and the local dividend yield, Ft is the vector of the three 
observable factors, CRt a crisis dummy, and Zi,t a vector of exogenous control variables, which 
are typically lagged by two quarters. The sample period is 1 January 1995 to 15 March 2009, 
i.e. it ends with the trough of the global equity market during the crisis. The sample contains 
                                                 
2 Whereas the imperfect integration of emerging markets into global capital markets is well-known (see for 
instance Bekaert and Harvey (1997), or Carrieri, Errunza and Hogan (2007)), the analysis in Bekaert, Hodrick and 
Zhang (2009) and Bodnar, Dumas and Marston (2003) motivates the use of both global/international and domestic 
factors from a statistical perspective, even for developed markets. 11
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about 725 weekly observations for our 415 country-sector equity portfolios. We define the 
financial crisis to begin on 7 August 2007, but later report a robustness analysis using the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008 as an alternative starting point.  
 
Each portfolio i reflects a country-sector portfolio, measured as the value-weighted returns of 
all stocks in a particular sector of a particular country at time t.
3 All returns are measured in 
dollars.
4 In order to obtain an intuitive interpretation of the estimates of the factor loadings, we 
orthogonalise the three factors. The global factor is orthogonalised by regressing global 
financial sector returns on US returns over the full sample period (including the crisis period) 
and then using the residuals of this regression as the global factor.
5 Similarly, following 
Bekaert, Hodrick and Zhang (2009), we extract a domestic return component which is 
orthogonal to those of both the US factor and the global factor by regressing each domestic 
market return on US returns and global financial sector returns, and then using the residual of 




2.1.1 Interdependence versus contagion 
 
A first step is to understand the evolution of equity market co-movements during tranquil 
times. In essence, this is a special case of the general model, or what one may refer to as an 
“interdependence model”, which eliminates CRt from the model for all t. Each portfolio’s risk 
exposure is then captured by three (potentially time-varying) factor loadings.  Under the null of 
this model, these betas determine the co-movement (“interdependence”) between the various 
portfolios.   
 
By adding the crisis dummy to equations (1) and (2), we allow (inter alia) for a change in the 
beta coefficients during the crisis. If there is evidence for such a change, this suggests that the 
interdependence model is not sufficient to capture the crisis effects. Consistent with the 
definition in Bekaert, Harvey and Ng (2005), we call this phenomenon contagion. The model 
we specify then tries to uncover the sources of contagion through the various γ or η 
coefficients.  
 
First, η in equation (1) captures contagion unrelated to the observable factors Ft of the model. 
Our analysis can therefore shed light on contagion theories involving investor behavior.  At the 
simplest level, the crisis may induce herd behavior where investors stop discriminating across 
firms and countries based on economic fundamentals. This “herding contagion” should not 
depend on macro-economic fundamentals at all. It is also likely to induce global rather than 
domestic contagion, as the pricing effects likely happen through the asset holdings of 
international investors (see Boyer, Kumagai, and Yuan (2006)) for concrete evidence during 
                                                 
3 To avoid adding-up constraints and spurious correlations, the
D
t R  factor is value-weighted across country-sector 
portfolios located in the same country as portfolio i, but excludes returns of portfolio i itself.  Strictly speaking, we 
would therefore need to denote domestic returns by
D\i
t R , but use the shortcut for notational ease. We choose 
domestic rather than regional market portfolios since country factors have been shown to capture most of the 
respective regional factor for a specific portfolio (e.g. Brooks and Del Negro 2006). 
4 We have also estimated the model in local currency excess returns with qualitatively similar results. 
5 Note that this orthogonalisation is quite independent relative to the precise time period over which it is done. For 
instance, orthogonalising separately for the crisis and non-crisis periods yields very similar factors as calculating it 
over the entire sample period. 
6 More specifically, the orthogonalised domestic factor is estimated for each country-sector portfolio i individually 
as portfolio i itself is excluded from the domestic market portfolio. 12
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the Asian crisis). Our Ș coefficients potentially measure such “non-fundamental” contagion. 
However, there are also rational stories of “investor contagion.” During a financial crisis, 
investors may face margin calls and/or may need to raise liquidity, which may transmit shocks 
from one country to another. Kodres and Pritsker (2002) develop a model where portfolio 
rebalancing creates “rational contagion,” the severity of which depends on shared macro-risk 
factors and the information asymmetry in each market. Kyle and Xiong (2001) focus on losses 
by arbitragers which may lead to liquidations in several markets, thus inducing contagion. 
Whatever the story, it appears that investor contagion would lead to stronger transmission of 
international shocks and thus cause some form of global, not domestic contagion. While we do 
not provide a formal test of these models, we later consider some instruments related to risk 
aversion that may be informative about these channels. 
 
Second, γ in equation (2) measures contagion via the factors Ft, i.e. changes in interdependence 
during the crisis. Such contagion during the crisis may be induced either by an unconditional 
increase in the factor loadings (γi,0) or an increase in the factor loadings conditional on a 
number of possible determinants Zi,t (γ1). The strength and novelty of this approach is that it 
allows us to identify the origin of contagion (global, US or domestic) and the transmission 
channels.   
 
 
2.1.2 Instruments to model time variation in exposures 
 
Equations (2) to (4) contain a set of lagged instruments, Zi,t-k, which are used to model the time 
variation in the exposures (ȕ,  Ȗ,  Ș). This practice has a long tradition in finance; see, for 
example, Ferson and Harvey (1991). We entertain a large number of potential instruments, 
which are listed in Table 1.  
 
The first set of variables primarily measures trade and financial openness. A great many 
researchers have pointed out the increased vulnerability to crises that comes with financial and 
economic integration (see Mendoza and Quadrini (2010) for a theoretical analysis).  The trade 
channel in particular has often been associated with international spillovers and contagion (see 
Forbes (2004), Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000)). Baele and Inghelbrecht (2009) show that it is 
important to account for trends in market integration before measuring contagion, which means 
that we must allow the interdependence coefficients to depend on openness indicators to 
properly test for contagion in a crisis, as average beta coefficients may underestimate the 
global exposures just before the crisis. Our proxies for the external exposure of our portfolios 
are mostly at the country level: exports plus imports (trade openness) and financial integration 
with the United States (via portfolio investment assets and liabilities); or financial depth 
(measured as the size of the domestic equity market capitalization), which has been shown to 
correlate with financial openness (see, e.g. Bekaert and Harvey, 1995). All measures are scaled 
by GDP. We also include exchange rate exposure, which may constitute an alternative, firm-
specific source for equity market co-movements (e.g. Dumas and Solnik 1995). The 
methodology for measuring exchange rate exposure is outlined in Appendix B. 
 
Because our model contains the global financial sector returns as a factor, we can also 
investigate a “banking channel” for global contagion during the recent crisis. A number of 
authors have stressed the importance of a banking channel, even for equity market contagion; 
see Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001), Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000), Tong and Wei 
(forthcoming), and Tong and Wei (2009). We would expect the effect of banking problems to 
be particularly severe for firms with financing constraints and for firms with more interest rate 13
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exposures, as they may have shorter maturity debt and thus face steeper refinancing costs. For 
instance, Almeida et al. (2009) find that firms with large portions of long-term debt maturing at 
the time of the crisis reduced investment significantly more than similar firms that did not need 
to refinance their debt during the crisis. Both these possibilities are accounted for in our model 
through the second set of variables, covering instruments for financing costs (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1998; Whited and Whu, 2006) and interest rate exposure (see the appendix for more 




The third set of variables consists of global measures of risk aversion and liquidity. Evidence is 
mounting that international asset prices are quite sensitive to such measures (see e.g. Bekaert, 
Harvey, Lundblad and Siegel, 2011; Baker, Wurgler and Yuan, 2009). The risk aversion of 
investors may substantially increase during the crisis, making them shun risky assets and flee 
into safer assets, in particular government bonds in the US and other advanced economies. We 
proxy for risk aversion through the VIX index of the S&P500. In addition, we include implied 
volatility in major foreign exchange markets as a proxy for uncertainty. Moreover, a central 
element of the crisis was a freezing of credit and inter-bank markets and a liquidity squeeze 
that made it difficult for financial and non-financial institutions to obtain capital. Indeed, a 
literature is emerging that stresses the role of (il)liquidity in causing or exacerbating crises (e.g. 
Adrian and Shin 2010, Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2009). We use the TED spread as an 
indicator of illiquidity, but it of course also reflects the credit risk of banks. Note that all these 
risk and liquidity variables are common to all equity portfolios in the sample. All these 
variables can also provide useful information about “investor contagion,” when used to drive 
time-variation in γ and or η. 
 
The fourth set of variables intends to provide a broad view of domestic macroeconomic 
fundamentals.  With these variables, we can test what Goldstein (1998) has coined the “wake-
up call” hypothesis, following the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis. During that crisis, potential 
risk determinants at the country level –such as the quality of economic policies and 
institutions– became more important for investors’ decisions relative to determinants at the 
firm, sector or global levels. This hypothesis is easily testable in our framework, as it implies 
that macro-economic fundamentals that do not matter in normal times suddenly matter in crisis 
times, as reflected in the Ȗit coefficients for our set of macro-economic indicators (Aizenman 
and Lee 2007, Rose and Spiegel 2010, Fratzscher 2009). The wake-up call hypothesis provides 
a potential explanation of “domestic contagion,” as defined in the previous sub-section. The set 
of variables includes measures of political and financial risk (for which we use ICRG ratings) 
in addition to the sovereign rating and the level of foreign exchange reserves. It also contains 
several macroeconomic indicators, namely the current account balance, the government budget 
balance, GDP growth and the unemployment rate.  
 
We also collected data on three country-specific policy responses to the crises (listed under 
“Financial policy variables”), namely capital injections in both financial and non-financial 
firms, as well as new or extended deposit guarantees and debt guarantees.
7 A key feature that 
we exploit for this analysis is that not all countries implemented such financial policies, that 
there are differences in the precise measures that were implemented, and in the timing of their 
announcement. We define dummy variables that take the value of one for the period after the 
                                                 
7 King (2009) uses these data in an event study to investigate the effect of such policies on the pricing of bonds 
and equities of domestic financial and non-financial institutions. 14
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announcements of the various policies, and for the full period of their existence.
8 This raises 
two caveats. First, official announcements of such financial policies may have been preceded 
by rumors or concrete indications that a government considers such policy measures, thus 
having a market effect even before an announcement is made. A second issue is that such 
policies may in part be endogenous to the crisis itself, i.e. they were implemented in response 
to the crisis hitting a particular country particularly hard. While we cannot resolve this 
potential endogeneity bias, we note that it should make it harder to prove in the data that such 
policies are associated with a smaller decline in equity markets. Our hypothesis is that these 
financial policy responses have helped countries and individual firms within a country to be 
more insulated and overall less affected by the crisis, which would show up as reducing the 
magnitude of domestic contagion in our model.  
 
Finally, we add some firm-specific variables, as in the original Ferson and Harvey (1991) 
work. These variables include size and value factors, which constitute proxies for systematic 
risks (as in the Fama and French (1992) factor model), or capture style investing which may 
depend on market sentiment and drive co-movements between stocks (Barberis, Shleifer, 
Wurgler, 2005). Appendix B provides additional information for portfolio-specific variables.  
 
 
2.2 Estimation, Specification Tests and Diagnostics 
 
2.2.1 Model Estimation 
 
We estimate our model for all portfolios jointly by means of pooled OLS, but account for 
cross-sectional dependence by clustering the standard errors across country portfolios. Note 
that the instruments Zi,t – with the exception of the financial policies, as outlined above – are 
lagged by 2 quarters in order to prevent that an unobserved factor may influence 
simultaneously both the degree of market integration and the fundamental Z in a given period, 
thus generating a spurious relationship between both.  
 
Because we have 24 instruments, an estimation of the full model will generate a large amount 
of insignificant regressors that needlessly inject noise into the estimated model. We therefore 
build on the work of David Hendry (see, for instance, Hendry and Krolzig (2005)) to pare 
down the regression to a more manageable number of independent variables. Concretely, we 
start by estimating model (1)-(4) with all instruments. We then eliminate the least statistically 
significant variable, using a significance threshold of 15%. We use relatively high significance 
levels, preferring to maintain a model with some useless regressors, rather than eliminate 
important ones. We proceed step-by-step by excluding individual variables, and 
simultaneously testing at each step whether an already excluded variable should be included 
again, until we arrive at a final encompassing model specification. Note that we keep a 
particular instrument, and all its interaction terms, if either its interdependence coefficient β1 or 
its contagion parameter γ1 is statistically significant. 
 
 
                                                 
8 In almost all cases such policies were still in existence at the end of our sample. We prefer to take the policy 
announcement, rather than the actual implementation – which in many cases took several weeks after the 
announcement – in order to capture the expectations effect of such policies on financial markets. Moreover, we 
prefer to use dummies rather than measures of the magnitude of deposit and debt guarantees and capital injections, 
primarily in order to obtain measures that are comparable across countries, as it is otherwise difficult to normalise 
and compare magnitudes of such measures in a meaningful way. 15
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2.2.2 Specification Tests and Diagnostics 
 
We now focus our attention to model fit. A well-specified factor model should render all 
correlations between the residuals of the 415 portfolio regressions negligible. Given the 
dimensionality of our estimation, a formal test of such a hypothesis is rather meaningless. 
Instead, we test and/or diagnose excess co-movements of the residuals at the country level, the 
most important dimension for contagion tests. 
 
To measure excess co-movements within countries, to each portfolio i we now add an indicator 
subscript c, denoting country. There are Nc portfolios within country c and recall that there are 
55 countries in total; so that c runs from 1 to 55. Excess co-movement within a country can 
occur when the factor model either systematically over or under predicts exposure to the 
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which is 
2(1) χ  under the null. We use 26 Newey-West (1987) lags in computing the variance 
of  , Ct EXCOV .  
 
We also compute two diagnostic statistics that are easily comparable across different models, 
or across different time periods (crisis versus non-crisis). First, let ȡi,j,c  be the correlation 
between the residual of portfolios i and j within country c. Thus we compute: 
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Second, the ECTEST averages the country-specific co-movements of residuals across all 
countries. It is conceivable that strong rejections in a few countries may not result in a rejection 
of the null. To better diagnose the performance of various models, we also compute the 
following country-level excess co-movement diagnostic: 
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ECDIAG                       (9) 
 
where the time series variance is again computed with accommodating for 26 Newey-West 
lags. 
 
If the country-specific test statistics would be independent, ECDIAG would have a 
2(55) χ  




3. Empirical Results 
 
Our modeling strategy is to first investigate the presence of interdependence versus contagion 
in sections 3.1 and 3.2, before turning to the channels of contagion, i.e. the determinants of 
time variation in interdependence and contagion in section 3.3. It turns out that allowing for 
time-variation in the betas does not affect our inference about contagion, but the cross-




Our extended asset pricing model (1)-(4) with crisis interactions and contagion may not be 
necessary to explain the transmission of the financial crisis in 2007-09. If the original factor 
model without contagion parameters correctly anticipated the systematic risks of the various 
portfolios, portfolios with larger (smaller) exposures to the US and global financial sector 
portfolios should presumably witness the steepest (smallest) valuation declines during the 
crisis. To explore this possibility, we estimate the following simple variant of our three-factor 
model: 
 
t i t i t i t t i e F R E R , 0 , , 1 , ' ] [ + + = − β     ( 1 2 )  
 
with all variables defined as before, and including the same three factors – a US factor, a global 
financial factor, and a domestic market factor. Table 2 reports the betas and displays the 
specification tests. The specification test ECTEST should be Ȥ
2(1) under the null, and rejects 
very strongly the null of no excess country-specific residual comovements, both across the full 
sample and in the crisis. Note that it is conceivable that the test has much less power during the 
shorter crisis period than over the full sample; yet the average within-country residual 
correlation is also similar across the two periods.  Including the crisis period in the estimation 
tends to slightly increase the betas, which helps improve fit within the crisis period and 
worsens it outside the crisis period. The ECDIAG test statistic is a whopping 618 over the full 
sample period and 482 over the crisis period.  The 1% critical value for a  Ȥ
2(55) is 94.42, but 
of course the various country statistics are not independent and are likely positively correlated. 
 
Tables 2 – 3 
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The betas reported are unweighted averages across all 415 portfolios, with the standard error 
also reflecting the covariance between the individual estimates. Economically, the average 
exposure to the three factors is not much different on average. It may be surprising that the 
exposure to the global banking sector is so large. However, if country factors dominate 
industry factors, this factor may proxy for the world market return, ex US.   
 
In Table 3, we explore the variation of the interdependence coefficients across portfolios, 
aggregating over regional groups and different industries. With the exception of Western 
Europe, the exposures to the domestic factor still dominate the exposures to the US or global 
financial factors.  Perhaps also not surprising are the relatively high exposure of Latin America 
to the US factor, and the correspondingly very low US exposure in Emerging Europe, Middle 
East/Africa and Emerging Asia. The variation of the different exposures across different 
industries is much smaller than across regions. Striking is the low exposure of the technology 
sector to the global, and its large exposure to the US factor. The highest exposure to the global 
factor is found for the financial sector, with a beta estimate of 0.58. In addition, the financial 
sector also has a relatively high exposure vis-à-vis the US factor.  
 
What would the model predict for the crisis? If the model is correctly specified, the factor 
exposures are sufficient to predict the relative vulnerability across the different portfolios 
during the crisis. Table 4 and Figure 1 represent the performance of the “interdependence 
model” to predict the relative stock return performances across countries. In Figure 1, we graph 
the actual cumulative returns across the crisis period on the vertical axis against its predicted 
value from the interdependence model (12) on the horizontal axis. The computation is 
straightforward. From estimating (12), we obtain  t i R , ˆ  for each portfolio i and each period/week 
t, and then obtain from these the total predicted return  i R ˆ  and compare this to the total actual 
return  i R  over the whole crisis period.
9 
 
Figure 1, Table 4 
 
If the model predicted the relative crisis severity perfectly, the regression line through the 
scatter plot should be identical to the 45 degree line.  Of course, it is pretty clear this is not the 
case. When we run a regression of actual on predicted returns for all 415 portfolios, we find: 
 
2 ˆ   7.037   0.489    ,   adj.  0.301
   (2.444)      (0.046)
ii i RR R ε =− + + =
 
 
with the joint test that the intercept is zero and the slope coefficient is unity being rejected. 
This relationship between actual and predicted returns is graphically shown through the line in 
Panel A of Figure 1.  
 
To obtain more information at the more aggregated country level rather than portfolio level, 
Panel B shows the distribution across countries, where actual and predicted returns for 
countries are unweighted averages across the portfolios of a particular country. On average the 
model under-predicts the severity of the crisis for nearly all countries and the prediction errors 
for some countries are quite large. To make the performance of the model more concrete, Table 
                                                 
9 More specifically, the series of weekly predicted returns is used to create a fitted price index, from which in turn 
the total return over the entire sample period is calculated. 18
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4 lists the various countries, ranked from worst to best actual crisis performance, then contrasts 
these returns with the predicted returns based on the three-factor interdependence asset-pricing 
model in the second set of columns (the table also shows the estimates for the contagion model, 
to which we turn in the next section).  
 
What is striking from the table is that most of the worst performing countries are in Eastern 
Europe. This makes sense intuitively as these countries were affected not only the strongest in 
terms of equity market performance, but also in terms of economic growth and activity. 
However, the interdependence model would predict some of the Eastern European countries to 
be only moderately affected. The Spearman rank correlation between actual and predicted 
returns is a relatively modest 0.68. It would be even smaller if the model did not include a 
domestic factor. The presence of a domestic factor allows Eastern European countries to be 
affected by the severe country-specific crises in their countries. Even so, the model still 
substantially fails to predict the absolute and relative severity of the crisis. Many commentators 
have expressed surprise about the relatively good performance of many emerging markets, 
which were at the heart of previous crises, like Thailand and Indonesia in South-East Asia, or 
Mexico and Brazil in Latin America. However, from the perspective of our benchmark model, 
the performance in three of these countries was actually worse than expected (Mexico is the 




Table 5 provides an analogous ranking for each of the 10 sectors, where all returns of 
portfolios within a particular sector are equally weighted averages across countries. Expected 
returns and realized returns are much more similar and highly correlated, especially in their 
ranking (with a Spearman rank correlation of 0.89), thus not exhibiting the same mismatch as 
across countries. For instance, equities in utilities, non-cyclical consumer goods or in the 
energy sector were indeed relatively less affected as predicted by the factor model, and the 




The three-factor interdependence model obviously performs relatively poorly in explaining the 
crisis severity. To benchmark this model, we compare the predictive power of this model with 
that of a more standard World CAPM model. We do so by re-estimating (12) including only 
the two common world factors, the global factor and the US factor. Figure 2 shows the fit of 
the model, again at the country and at the portfolio levels. A regression of actual on predicted 
returns for all 415 portfolios for this two-factor model yields: 
 
2 ˆˆ   13.036   0.256   ,   adj.  0.094
    (3.439)  (0.058)
ii i RR R ε =− + + =
 
 
The R-squared decreases from 0.301 in the three-factor model with the domestic factor to only 
0.094 for the two-factor model without the domestic factor. Moreover, the slope coefficient of 
the two-factor model is substantially smaller as it drops by about one half. Overall, this 
suggests that the domestic factor is indeed highly important in improving the predictive power 
of the model for the 2007-09 financial crisis, even without yet allowing for contagion in the 
model specification.  
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In summary, the exploratory analysis of this sub-section shows that a simple constant beta 
model fails to explain the transmission of the 2007-09 financial crisis to equity markets 
globally. Because of the nature of the interdependence model, it must be the case that the 
countries with the strongest equity market collapses during the crisis are those that have been 
traditionally less open and exposed to the global and US factors (hence, they have a low 
predicted equity market decline during the crisis), while the less severely affected ones 
generally had substantially higher loadings for the US and global factors before the crisis. We 




Was there contagion in global equity markets during the 2007-09 financial crisis? If so, what 
type of contagion – did contagion primarily emanate from the global financial sector, from the 
US or from the domestic market? To address these questions, we now turn to the estimation 
results of the asset pricing model (1)-(4), but still restricting the coefficients on Zi,t to be zero: 
 
                  t i t i t t i t i t t i e CR F R E R , 0 , , , 1 , ' ] [ + + + = − η β     (13) 
t i i t i CR 0 , 0 , , γ β β + =          ( 1 4 )  
 
Our primary interest is in the parameters of interdependence  0 , i β  and of contagion 0 , i γ . Table 6 
provides the aggregate results with the average coefficients across all portfolios. Before we 
discuss the parameter estimates, let’s briefly discuss the fit. Compared to Table 2, the R
2 
increases by 4% and all statistics improve for the full model, suggesting that the imposition of 
constant betas across the two periods was a mis-specification. Still the model remains rejected 
at the 1% level. The crisis-specific exposures suffice for the model to eliminate within-country 
residual correlation and the model fails to reject at the 5% level for that period. The average 




More importantly, the parameter estimates reveal several important patterns. First, the 
interdependence coefficients have decreased slightly, already suggesting that “dummying out” 
the crisis period overall leads to decreased co-movement between the portfolios.  Second, there 
is statistically strong evidence for the presence of contagion from all three sources: from the 
global financial sector, from the US market, as well as from the domestic market. Finally, and 
most strikingly, contagion during the 2007-09 crisis seems to have been primarily domestic in 
nature. The domestic contagion estimate of 0.249 is much larger than the analogous estimates 
for US contagion of 0.133 and global contagion of 0.056. 
 
The contagion parameters from global and US markets being small in magnitude relative to the 
interdependence exposures during “normal” times is inconsistent with the “globalization 
hypothesis”. Equity markets worldwide connected only slightly more strongly with what 
happened in the US or the global financial sector. In contrast, the dominance of domestic 
contagion suggests that the fate of equity portfolios during the crisis became primarily linked 
to that of other domestic portfolios. The economic magnitude of this effect is large as the 
domestic factor betas on average increase by 50%. This is striking and one of the key findings 
of the paper. Note that all of the contagion seems to be captured by changing factor exposures, 
as the Ș coefficients are, at least on average, small and insignificant.  20
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The evidence on the average contagion and interdependence parameters of Table 6 potentially 
masks a considerable degree of heterogeneity across equity portfolios. For instance, the fact 
that there is very little contagion on average from US markets during the crisis may be 
consistent with the fact that some equity portfolios indeed experienced significant contagion 
from the US while other portfolios experienced “negative contagion” or a de-coupling from US 
markets during the 2007-09 financial crisis.  
 
Table 7, Figure 3 
 
Table 7 provides an alternative perspective on the nature of contagion we have uncovered by 
reporting the cross-sectional correlations between the various contagion and interdependence 
coefficients across the 415 portfolios.  The interdependence coefficients are substantially 
positively correlated, suggesting a positive association between domestic and international 
systematic risk. There is also significant but mostly more moderate positive correlation across 
different types of contagion – those portfolios experiencing more domestic contagion were also 
more exposed to global and US sources of risk during the crisis.  
 
Most striking is the mostly substantial negative correlation between the interdependence and 
contagion coefficients, indicating that portfolios that were less exposed to the three factors 
before the crisis experienced the strongest contagion during the crisis. This is true both for 
international and domestic exposure. Such evidence is rather damning for the ability of 
standard factor models to differentiate systematic risks across portfolios during global crises.  
 
Figure 3 shows that there is a significant degree of heterogeneity in the contagion parameters 
across portfolios. Importantly, while there are many portfolios that experienced positive 
contagion from global, US or domestic sources during the crisis, there are also a number of 
portfolios that had negative contagion, i.e. managed to some extent to decouple from equity 
market movements elsewhere. Given the parameter estimates reported before, it is no surprise 




Table 8 provides the parameter estimates of Equations (13)-(14) averaged at the regional 
(Panel A) and sectoral (Panel B) levels. Panel A confirms that domestic contagion dominates 
US or global contagion, as the estimates for the former are positive, significant and sizeable for 
all regions. Only in Latin America is US contagion slightly larger than domestic contagion. 
Domestic contagion is most important in Emerging Europe and the Middle East/Africa, but 
Emerging Europe shows significant global and US contagion parameters as well. Moreover, 
the Ș parameter – measuring equity movements during the crisis which are not accounted for 
by the three factors – is only negative in a statistically significant fashion for Emerging Europe. 
This implies that the three factors in our model do a reasonably good job in explaining the 
dynamics of equity returns during the crisis.  
 
As to the sector analysis in Panel B, there are only three sectors that have significant contagion 
coefficients for the global factor, namely energy, financial and technology portfolios.  The non-
cyclical consumer goods sector shows a negative coefficient, suggesting some form of 
decoupling during the crisis, but the economic effect is certainly not large.  Most sectors show 
positive contagion from the US market, with the strongest effects mostly in the 
production/manufacturing sectors (industrial, energy, basic materials and utilities). Technology 21
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shows a negative coefficient, but this sector was ex-ante heavily exposed to the US factor, and 
thus partially decoupled during the crisis. There is positive and mostly sizeable domestic 
contagion for portfolios in 9 out of the 10 sectors, broadly confirming that domestic contagion 
is not simply driven by the large response of a few portfolios in a few sectors. Finally, the 
decline in financial sector equities cannot be fully accounted for by the three factors in the 
model, i.e. Ș is negative and large at -0.217. 
 
The contagion model matches quite well the severity of the equity market collapse during the 
2007-09 crisis. First, the third set of columns of Table 4 shows much less systematic downward 
bias than the interdependence model, almost perfectly matching the equity market collapse for 
a number of countries. Second, the contagion model also fits the cross-country differences in 
severity across countries; in fact, the Spearman rank correlation is 0.91 for the contagion 
model, which is high and also substantially higher than the 0.68 rank correlation recorded for 




The goodness of fit is illustrated graphically in Figure 4. Unlike the interdependence model 
(Figure 1), the predicted overall crisis returns from the contagion model are very similar to the 
actual overall returns, both at the portfolio level and at the country level. A regression from 
actual on predicted returns from the contagion model at the portfolio level yields: 
 
2 ˆˆ    1.910  0.971   ,  adj.  0.843
    (2.322)  (0.033)
ii i RR R ε =+ + =
 
 
The slope coefficient is close to unity, and the R-squared is 84%, confirming the good fit. The 




Finally, Table 9 reports a robustness test for the definition of the financial crisis, where the 
crisis starts only with the collapse of Lehman Brothers in mid-September 2008 (rather than in 
early August 2007 as in the benchmark). As shown in the second set of columns, this makes no 
meaningful difference to the findings. In fact, the domestic contagion parameter becomes 
somewhat larger, while there is little change in the coefficients for US and global contagion.  
 
An intriguing question is whether the 2007-09 crisis differs markedly with regard to the 
transmission mechanism and contagion from other past crises. Since our sample starts only in 
1995, and going back further would substantially reduce the sample size (in particular with 
regard to emerging economies), the two equity market collapses we focus on are the 1998 
LTCM crisis and the strong decline of equity markets between 2000 and 2002 (the TMT bust). 
Table 9 shows the estimates for these two events, based on an estimation of the contagion 
model, but excluding the 2007-09 financial crisis from the sample. The findings indicate that 
there was little if any systematic contagion at the global level during those two episodes. In 
fact, the global and US contagion parameters are significant and negative, suggesting a slight 
de-coupling of equity markets with the US market or the global financial sector during those 
episodes. There is no evidence for domestic contagion during those early equity market crises.  
Hence the importance and even dominance of domestic contagion appears a truly defining 
feature of the 2007-09 crisis. 22
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In summary, the evidence uncovered so far suggests that there has been equity contagion from 
the global financial sector, from the US market and from domestic markets during the 2007-09 
financial crisis. The intriguing finding is that contagion during the crisis was mainly domestic 
in origin, implying that this genuine global crisis ironically primarily drove up within-country 
equity return co-movements. These findings are robust to various extensions and alternative 
model specifications and apply to various levels of aggregation. Moreover, we also find a 
significant degree of heterogeneity in contagion across portfolios. We now try to explain the 
sources of this heterogeneity. 
 
 
3.3 Channels of contagion and interdependence 
 
Figure 3 reveals substantial heterogeneity in the contagion and interdependence coefficients 
across individual country-sector equity portfolios. What explains this heterogeneity? Is it 
related to the external exposure of portfolios –or what we referred to as the “globalization 
hypothesis”? Is it linked to country-specific factors and risks –what we call the “wake-up call 
hypothesis”? Or is it related to other common factors? We discussed these hypotheses in detail 




To start, Table 10 reports estimates of the interdependence model with instruments (i.e. it 
includes  Zi,t, but excludes the crisis dummy, CRt). We report only the coefficients on the 
instruments that survive the model reduction method described in Section 2. The specification 
tests reveal that introducing the instruments improves the model fit about as much as the 
addition of the crisis dummy (and thereby the possibility of contagion) does. The R-squared 
increases by 4%, the test statistic comes down considerably but still rejects the model at the 1% 
level, and the diagnostic statistic is reduced to 385. During the crisis, the model cannot even be 
rejected at the 5% level, and within country residuals now show less than 4% correlation.  
 
To gauge the economic relevance of the estimates, the last column shows interdecile 
differences in exposures. These reflect the difference between the predicted beta when 
evaluated at the 90
th percentile of the instrument’s distribution and the beta evaluated at the 
10
th percentile of the distribution.  For example, the effect of financial depth on the beta with 
respect to the global factor is both statistically and economically small, as the interdecile range 
means that a large change in market capitalization relative to GDP only induces a 0.02 change 
in beta. 
 
The key instruments causing time-variation in the factor exposures are the external exposure 
variables and the TED spread.  Trade integration has, not surprisingly, very strong effects, both 
statistically and economically, on the exposures of the portfolios with respect to global and US 
factors, confirming results in the literature (see e.g. Baele (2005)). Domestic exposures are 
larger in countries with more developed stock markets, with the effect both statistically and 
economically important.  This finding seems inconsistent with the literature suggesting that 
development goes hand-in-hand with an increase in idiosyncratic risk (see e.g. Morck, Yeung 
and Yu (2000)). Note that this article focuses on cross-sectional relationships, while our 
coefficients are identified from a rich panel data set, with plenty of time series variation in 
market capitalization to GDP in many countries. Finally, the TED spread invariably 
significantly increases factor exposures, with the effect economically the strongest for 23
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domestic factor betas. It is conceivable that this variable identifies the aggregate financing 
implications of the liquidity problems in the financing markets, but it may also proxy for more 
general risk aversion, causing excessive co-movement in periods of high risk aversion.   
 
The only macroeconomic variable that enters the betas significantly is the current account 
balance. The dependence on the US factor significantly increases when it deteriorates, but the 




In Table 11, we report the full model, now also introducing instruments for the contagion 
parameters. In terms of specification tests, the model has the best fit overall in terms of the 
actual specification tests ECTEST, with its value dropping to 15.90 for the full sample and 
becoming really small for the crisis period.  Its residual correlations are also the smallest of all 
models in both periods.  However, in terms of the diagnostic statistic, the interdependence 
model with instruments produces a lower value over the full sample and is about as good for 
the crisis period. This is true despite the fact that the contagion model has many more 
instruments. Because we impose that instruments survive jointly in the contagion and 
interdependence coefficients, the many new significant variables we observe are mostly 
identified through exposures during the crisis being very different from before the crisis.   
 
Our first main result is that during the crisis, the US factor exposure to trade integration and 
financial integration decreased substantially. The effects of trade integration on the global and 
domestic factor betas merely reflect insignificant changes from the strong basic 
interdependence effect.  In other words, the globalization hypothesis is strongly rejected by the 
data; in fact, we find that the behavior of portfolios entirely decoupled from their pre -crisis 
external dependence.  
 
Second, perhaps surprisingly, we find that the effect of the TED spread (and in one case also 
the VIX) substantially and significantly decreased during the crisis.  The coefficients are such 
that in periods outside the recent global crisis, small increases in risk would translate into much 
stronger co-movements, but that in the crisis these variables generate almost no effect on the 
co-movements. One plausible interpretation of this finding is that shocks to liquidity, as 
proxied by TED spreads, during the crisis were widely reported to have triggered capital flows 
into the US and out of emerging economies, thus inducing a decoupling and a drop of the US 
and global factor loadings, Moreover, a rise in the TED spread also reduces co-movement 
across domestic equity portfolios, which may be explained by differences in the dependence on 
liquidity across sectors (e.g. with the financial sector likely to be affected very strongly). 
 
Importantly, we do find intriguing evidence in favor of the wake-up call hypothesis.  Several 
macro-economic fundamental variables are significant drivers of the contagion exposures.  A 
current account deficit very significantly increases the exposure to the global factor; whereas 
poor sovereign ratings substantially increase the exposure to the US factor.   
 
Moreover, domestic contagion is much reduced for countries with significant foreign exchange 
reserves. This finding is related to the current debate about the appropriate level of foreign 
exchange reserves countries should hold. Many international finance experts have been 
surprised by the very large stockpiles of official reserves built up by emerging markets over the 
last decade. It appears that in the recent crisis, this was one factor that made them perform 
better than countries that had “insured less” and were viewed riskier by financial markets. It 24
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remains perhaps a bit surprising that the variable only affects domestic and not global 
contagion.   
 
Overall, investors discriminated largely on the basis of domestic economic and political risk 
factors. Hence, governments that attempted to introduce policies to reduce the vulnerability of 
their economies may have well mitigated contagion.  Our analysis of the capital injections, and 
deposit and debt guarantee dummies suggest that these policies indeed were successful in 
reducing contagion. The introduction of deposit guarantees significantly reduced domestic 
contagion, with the coefficient featuring the largest interdecile range among the instruments 
affecting domestic contagion. Its effect on global exposure is only statistically significant at the 
10% level but still economically important. Debt guarantees have a similar effect on global 
exposures as deposit guarantees but also affect US exposure significantly (at the 5% level). For 
instance, the introduction or extension of debt or deposit guarantees during the crisis reduced 
the exposure of equity portfolios to the global factor by more than 0.30 compared to countries 
that did not introduce such policies. 
 
Finally, none of the firm-specific instruments survived the model selection procedure, 
including various proxies for financial constraints at the firm level, as defined above. We have 
conducted several robustness checks. The findings overall prove highly robust to changes in 
the sample, e.g. by excluding particular countries or sectors. In particular, the benchmark 
estimates are robust to excluding all financial sector portfolios from the sample.
 
In summary, the findings of this section suggest that contagion during the 2007-09 crisis was to 
a significant extent systematically related to observable factors. In particular, strong domestic 
economic policies significantly reduced the exposure of portfolios to contagion. By contrast, 
the exposure to external factors, such as via trade or financial linkages, or financial constraints 






The 2007-09 financial crisis has been truly remarkable in its severity and global reach. This 
paper seeks to understand the global transmission channels of the crisis in equity markets, 
studying the cross-sectional heterogeneity of the crisis incidence across 55 equity markets.  
Despite its origination in the US, we find little evidence of systematic contagion from US 
markets to global equity markets during the crisis. Instead, there was systematic contagion 
from domestic equity markets to individual equity portfolios. 
 
Yet, the financial crisis did not spread indiscriminately across countries and sectors. In 
particular portfolios in countries with weak economic fundamentals, poor policies and bad 
institutions experienced more contagion, both from US and domestic markets, and were overall 
more severely affected by the global financial crisis. Moreover, good macroeconomic policies 
and the presence of financial policies during the crisis, in the form of debt and deposit 
guarantees, were instrumental in shielding domestic equity portfolios to some extent from the 
2007-09 financial crisis.  
 
The irony of this perhaps most global crisis ever is that a market’s external exposure played 
such a small role in determining its equity market performance.  Instead, investors focused 
primarily on country-specific characteristics and punished markets with poor macroeconomic 25
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fundamentals, policies and institutions. Our findings support the recent efforts by policymakers 
and international organizations to better understand macroprudential risks and perhaps institute 
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Figure 1: Goodness of fit – Interdependence model
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Notes: The figures show the total actual equity market returns over the entire crisis period (August 2007 – March 
2009) against the fitted total returns from the interdependence model (12), by portfolio (Panel A) and by country 
(Panel B). Country returns in Panel B are unweighted averages of portfolios within countries. The dashed line 
shows the 45 degree line. 30
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Figure 2: Goodness of fit – Interdependence model – World CAPM (no domestic 
factor)


















































































































-80 -60 -40 -20 0 20
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Notes: The figure is based on the two-factor model without the domestic factor (i.e. only the global and US 
factors). It shows the cumulated actual equity market returns over the entire crisis period (August 2007 – March 
2009) against the fitted cumulated returns from the interdependence model, by portfolio (Panel A) and by country 
(Panel B). Country returns in Panel B are unweighted averages of portfolios within countries. The dashed line 
shows the 45 degree line. 31
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Figure 3: Distribution of Contagion Coefficients 
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Notes: The figures show the distribution of the contagion coefficients γι,0 from the estimation of (13)-(14) across 
all 415 equity portfolios from the factor model. 32
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Figure 4: Goodness of fit –Contagion model  
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fitted returns
 
Notes: The figures show the cumulated actual equity market returns over the entire crisis period (August 2007 – 
March 2009) against the fitted cumulated returns from the contagion model (13) and (14), by portfolio (Panel A) 
and by country (Panel B). Country returns in Panel B are unweighted averages of portfolios within countries. The 
dashed line shows the 45 degree line.33
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   ECTEST 53.35
   EXCOR 0.11
   ECDIAG 618.31
Crisis Period
   ECTEST 12.09
   EXCOR 0.11














Notes: The table shows the estimates of the following model: 
t i t i t i t t i e F R E R , 0 , , 1 , ' ] [ + + = − β     (12) 
The table reports the unweighted average degree of interdependence across all portfolios in the sample, where G 
denotes the global factor, U the US factor, and D the domestic factor. The test statistics are described in section 2.2. 
The critical value of a Ȥ 
2 (1)-distributed variable is 3.84 (6.63) at the 5% (1%) level. The model is estimated 
allowing for errors to be clustered by country. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively.  35
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Table 3: Interdependence across Regions and Sectors 
 
A. By region 
Region
Latin America 0.360 *** 0.594 *** 0.604 ***
Western Europe 0.539 *** 0.633 *** 0.512 ***
Emerging Europe 0.347 *** 0.273 *** 0.473 ***
Middle East/Africa 0.163 *** 0.084 *** 0.467 ***
Developed Asia 0.531 *** 0.494 *** 0.655 ***











B. By sector 
Sector
Basic Materials 0.446 *** 0.460 *** 0.586 ***
Communications 0.303 *** 0.448 *** 0.562 ***
Consumer, Cyclical 0.410 *** 0.416 *** 0.568 ***
Consumer, Non-cycl 0.358 *** 0.360 *** 0.492 ***
Diversified 0.471 *** 0.522 *** 0.762 ***
Energy 0.402 *** 0.393 *** 0.499 ***
Financial 0.583 *** 0.492 *** 0.476 ***
Industrial 0.421 *** 0.440 *** 0.561 ***
Technology 0.249 *** 0.679 *** 0.575 ***










Notes: The table shows the estimates of the following model: 
t i t i t i t t i e F R E R , 0 , , 1 , ' ] [ + + = − β     (12) 
The table provides estimates of the average degrees of interdependence across portfolios within a particular region 
(Panel A), and those within a particular sector (Panel B), where G denotes the global factor, U the US factor, and D 
the domestic factor. The standard errors are clustered by country. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4: Predicting Crisis Returns 
Country returns rank returns rank returns rank
Serbia -85.6 1 -57.6 2 -73.6 1 0.090 0.043 0.630 -0.039 0.247 0.007 -0.804
Ukraine -77.9 2 -35.3 20 -72.3 2 0.213 0.153 0.233 0.182 0.101 0.606 -0.356
Romania -77.3 3 -31.7 28 -66.5 4 0.213 0.145 0.228 0.106 0.205 0.483 -0.677
Bulgaria -74.2 4 -50.3 6 -65.9 5 0.158 0.047 0.199 0.283 0.253 0.534 0.190
Slovenia -71.9 5 -30.8 30 -58.3 11 0.287 0.059 0.385 -0.024 0.119 0.444 -0.400
Poland -69.5 6 -52.3 4 -65.2 6 0.436 0.493 0.416 0.278 0.320 0.428 -0.031
Iceland -67.7 7 -46.4 8 -62.9 8 0.304 0.143 0.442 -0.104 0.046 0.044 -0.363
Russia -66.2 8 -43.4 11 -57.7 12 0.187 0.261 0.285 0.328 0.282 0.361 0.112
Latvia -64.3 9 -39.9 13 -61.5 10 0.188 0.063 0.343 0.088 0.134 0.126 -0.432
Estonia -64.3 10 -45.8 9 -64.2 7 0.322 0.215 0.286 0.089 0.239 0.518 -0.168
Turkey -64.1 11 -70.6 1 -69.8 3 0.671 0.644 0.823 0.363 0.116 0.018 0.168
Croatia -63.9 12 -39.1 14 -48.3 17 0.248 0.059 0.324 0.028 0.287 0.499 0.105
Lithuania -61.4 13 -36.6 18 -53.3 14 0.165 0.073 0.407 0.119 0.055 0.310 -0.236
Ireland -61.3 14 -30.4 33 -48.0 18 0.498 0.421 0.343 -0.108 0.141 0.049 -0.643
New Zealand -60.2 15 -52.2 5 -62.2 9 0.388 0.356 0.641 0.061 0.175 0.164 -0.267
Norway -60.1 16 -30.6 31 -49.0 16 0.453 0.453 0.569 0.021 0.364 0.177 -0.244
Hungary -59.6 17 -53.6 3 -55.9 13 0.544 0.562 0.559 -0.046 0.129 0.226 0.088
Italy -55.5 18 -35.9 19 -43.1 21 0.434 0.682 0.495 0.134 0.164 0.288 -0.097
Egypt -54.2 19 -13.0 48 -11.2 49 0.153 0.060 0.326 0.268 -0.143 0.529 0.270
Korea -52.9 20 -44.8 10 -45.4 19 0.491 0.558 0.613 0.062 0.251 0.210 0.178
Portugal -52.1 21 -32.8 25 -36.1 26 0.424 0.373 0.580 0.048 0.148 0.211 -0.051
Czech Republic -52.1 22 -47.8 7 -50.4 15 0.569 0.295 0.563 0.005 0.125 0.107 -0.003
Brazil -51.2 23 -37.0 17 -44.7 20 0.391 0.834 0.605 0.104 0.411 0.173 -0.038
Sweden -51.0 24 -33.9 23 -37.8 23 0.561 0.700 0.404 -0.014 0.325 0.419 -0.018
Finland -49.7 25 -25.4 37 -38.8 22 0.451 0.572 0.366 -0.059 0.280 0.453 -0.162
Thailand -48.8 26 -19.2 41 -37.0 24 0.398 0.273 0.521 0.171 0.162 0.250 -0.354
France -47.1 27 -32.6 26 -33.0 28 0.651 0.829 0.535 -0.068 0.182 0.328 -0.021
UK -43.9 28 -26.9 35 -27.5 32 0.525 0.612 0.508 0.048 0.182 0.378 0.009
Argentina -42.2 29 -3.8 53 -13.6 47 0.232 0.362 0.406 0.203 0.165 0.238 -0.226
China -42.2 30 -38.6 15 -36.6 25 0.053 -0.015 0.702 0.036 -0.276 0.124 0.047
Spain -41.6 31 -19.6 40 -24.2 37 0.518 0.615 0.486 0.067 0.183 0.357 -0.025
Netherlands -40.5 32 -32.3 27 -25.1 35 0.505 0.928 0.430 0.058 0.001 0.227 0.157
Denmark -40.5 33 -21.2 39 -31.1 29 0.537 0.424 0.310 0.092 0.269 0.377 -0.088
India -40.4 34 -14.2 47 -24.3 36 0.252 0.417 0.627 0.234 -0.006 0.265 -0.058
Colombia -39.8 35 -42.6 12 -23.4 39 0.220 0.284 0.621 0.149 0.264 0.225 0.651
Singapore -39.7 36 -35.0 22 -24.2 38 0.735 0.591 0.568 -0.286 0.026 0.316 0.181
Indonesia -39.2 37 -28.4 34 -26.6 33 0.587 0.358 0.662 0.051 -0.011 0.230 0.091
Germany -37.8 38 -35.1 21 -29.1 30 0.646 0.962 0.553 -0.090 -0.099 0.163 0.047
Belgium -35.7 39 -30.6 32 -26.5 34 0.550 0.461 0.497 0.004 0.183 -0.019 0.043
UAE -35.6 40 -14.5 46 -6.7 52 -0.017 0.002 0.143 0.204 -0.178 0.422 0.451
Chile -35.1 41 -17.7 44 -22.2 41 0.298 0.470 0.622 0.019 0.162 0.314 -0.065
Taiwan -34.9 42 -32.9 24 -28.7 31 0.399 0.323 0.686 -0.064 0.155 0.116 0.116
Hong Kong -33.7 43 -12.9 49 -22.3 40 0.442 0.489 0.487 0.219 0.249 0.442 -0.160
Mexico -33.2 44 -37.0 16 -33.2 27 0.391 0.769 0.609 -0.044 0.074 0.087 0.109
Austria -33.1 45 -31.0 29 -17.1 44 0.507 0.396 0.544 0.091 0.201 0.171 0.251
Qatar -32.1 46 -3.4 54 2.4 54 0.046 -0.018 0.341 0.010 -0.041 0.373 0.148
Australia -31.8 47 -26.2 36 -21.3 42 0.479 0.457 0.631 -0.075 0.122 -0.013 0.078
Switzerland -30.8 48 -25.4 38 -15.8 45 0.580 0.644 0.461 0.043 0.146 -0.016 0.201
Japan -30.6 49 -19.1 42 -17.4 43 0.553 0.293 0.753 0.010 0.062 0.054 0.010
Luxembourg -27.4 50 -17.7 43 -6.7 51 0.339 0.194 0.149 0.172 0.281 0.327 0.265
Israel -21.7 51 -17.3 45 -14.0 46 0.197 0.338 0.594 -0.047 0.077 0.272 0.118
Canada -19.1 52 -3.9 52 -10.6 50 0.206 0.346 0.246 -0.066 -0.155 0.105 -0.161
Malta -13.8 53 -10.2 51 -12.2 48 -0.096 0.020 0.324 -0.017 -0.053 0.179 0.066
Tunisia -9.7 54 -10.5 50 -6.6 53 0.232 0.024 0.554 0.031 0.051 0.083 -0.078









i 0 , β
U
i 0 , β
D
i 0 , β
G
i 0 , γ
U
i 0 , γ
D
i 0 , γ 0 , i η
 
Notes: The table shows total actual equity market returns over the entire crisis period (Aug. 2007 – March 2009) 
against the fitted total returns from the interdependence model (see Table 2 for explanations) and against the fitted 
total returns from the contagion model (see Table 6). Portfolio returns in the table are averaged within countries. 
Countries are ranked according to actual equity market returns during the crisis. The model parameters shown are 
from the contagion model. 37
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Table 5: Predicting Crisis Returns – Distribution at the Sector Level 
Sector returns rank returns rank returns rank
Financial -55.0 1 -30.6 1 -41.6 1 0.495 0.441 0.439 0.203 0.106 0.194 -0.217
Basic Materials -53.5 2 -29.1 3 -39.6 2 0.391 0.379 0.494 0.009 0.324 0.469 -0.103
Diversified -52.4 3 -29.3 2 -35.9 3 0.433 0.477 0.709 0.037 0.157 0.163 -0.045
Consumer, Cycli -45.7 4 -28.4 4 -34.2 4 0.379 0.386 0.519 0.039 0.096 0.232 -0.068
Industrial -44.6 5 -24.4 8 -32.5 5 0.379 0.383 0.498 0.033 0.196 0.335 -0.148
Technology -43.0 6 -27.8 5 -29.2 6 0.217 0.704 0.574 0.192 -0.157 0.083 -0.105
Energy -40.6 7 -27.0 7 -26.8 7 0.336 0.320 0.433 0.103 0.286 0.401 0.172
Communications -39.7 8 -27.7 6 -25.6 8 0.305 0.455 0.539 0.015 -0.037 0.096 0.036
Utilities -35.0 9 -18.6 10 -18.8 10 0.286 0.236 0.394 0.068 0.179 0.310 0.172





Fitted returns Actual returns
Model (contagion model)
G
i 0 , β
U
i 0 , β
D
i 0 , β
G
i 0 , γ
U
i 0 , γ
D
i 0 , γ 0 , i η
 
Notes: The table shows at the sector level the total actual equity market returns over the entire crisis period (August 
2007 – March 2009) against the fitted total returns from the interdependence model (see Table 2 for explanations) 
and against the fitted total returns from the contagion model (see Table 6). Portfolio returns in the table are 
unweighted averages within sectors. Sectors are ranked according to actual equity market returns during the crisis. 
The model parameters are from the contagion model specification (see Table 6). 38
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   ECTEST 27.78
   EXCOR 0.06
   ECDIAG 459.73
Crisis Period
   ECTEST 0.00
   EXCOR 0.01




















Notes: The table shows the estimates of the following model: 
t i t i t t i t i t t i e CR F R E R , 0 , , , 1 , ' ] [ + + + = − η β     (13) 
t i i t i CR 0 , 0 , , γ β β + =         ( 1 4 )  
The table reports estimates of the unweighted average degree of contagion and interdependence across all portfolios 
in the sample. The critical value of a Ȥ 
2 (1)-distributed variable is 3.84 (6.63) at the 5% (1%) level. The model is 
estimated allowing for errors to be clustered by country. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 39
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-0.273 -0.027 -0.210 1
0.000 0.590 0.000
-0.153 -0.203 -0.302 0.620 1
0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
-0.077 -0.276 -0.524 0.319 0.389 1
0.119 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Other
0.092 0.099 0.092 -0.018 0.012 -0.038 1





























Notes: The table shows the correlation coefficients across the estimates of the various contagion and 
interdependence coefficients for the 415 portfolios in the sample, based on the following model: 
t i t i t t i t i t t i e CR F R E R , 0 , , , 1 , ' ] [ + + + = − η β     (13) 
t i i t i CR 0 , 0 , , γ β β + =         ( 1 4 )  
P-values are shown below the correlation coefficients in smaller figures and italics. Standard errors are based on the 
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Table 8: Contagion and Interdependence across Regions and Sectors 
 
A. By region 
Region
Latin America 0.090 *** 0.223 *** 0.212 *** 0.305 *** 0.537 *** 0.575 *** 0.091
Western Europe 0.015 0.173 *** 0.241 *** 0.509 *** 0.588 *** 0.468 *** -0.049
Emerging Europe 0.109 *** 0.167 *** 0.318 *** 0.281 *** 0.209 *** 0.405 *** -0.160 ***
Middle East/Africa 0.082 * -0.038 0.337 *** 0.127 *** 0.092 *** 0.406 *** 0.171 *
Developed Asia 0.016 0.156 *** 0.194 *** 0.507 *** 0.455 *** 0.617 *** 0.005

















B. By sector 
Sector
Basic Materials 0.009 0.324 *** 0.469 *** 0.391 *** 0.379 *** 0.494 *** -0.103
Communications 0.015 -0.037 0.096 *** 0.305 *** 0.455 *** 0.539 *** 0.036
Consumer, Cyclical 0.039 0.096 *** 0.232 *** 0.379 *** 0.386 *** 0.519 *** -0.068
Consumer, Non-cycl -0.075 *** 0.091 *** 0.137 *** 0.366 *** 0.341 *** 0.462 *** 0.000
Diversified 0.037 0.157 * 0.163 *** 0.433 *** 0.477 *** 0.709 *** -0.045
Energy 0.103 ** 0.286 *** 0.401 *** 0.336 *** 0.320 *** 0.433 *** 0.172 ***
Financial 0.203 *** 0.106 *** 0.194 *** 0.495 *** 0.441 *** 0.439 *** -0.217 ***
Industrial 0.033 0.196 *** 0.335 *** 0.379 *** 0.383 *** 0.498 *** -0.148 *
Technology 0.192 *** -0.157 ** 0.083 0.217 *** 0.704 *** 0.574 *** -0.105













0 β 0 η
 
 
Notes: The table shows the estimates of the following model: 
t i t i t t i t i t t i e CR F R E R , 0 , , , 1 , ' ] [ + + + = − η β     (13) 
t i i t i CR 0 , 0 , , γ β β + =         ( 1 4 )  
The table reports the average contagion and interdependence coefficients across portfolios within a particular region 
(Panel A), and those within a particular sector (Panel B). The standard errors are clustered by country. ***, **, and * 
indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 41
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Table 9: Contagion and Interdependence – Robustness 
 
coef st.err. coef st.err. coef st.err. coef st.err.
Contagion
0.056 *** 0.013 0.047 *** 0.014 -0.089 *** 0.019 0.010 0.013
0.133 *** 0.015 0.142 *** 0.018 -0.026 *** 0.002 -0.004 * 0.002
0.249 *** 0.016 0.283 *** 0.021 -0.030 0.030 -0.013 0.026
Interdependence
0.368 *** 0.012 0.375 *** 0.012 0.381 *** 0.012 0.365 *** 0.012
0.397 *** 0.016 0.405 *** 0.016 0.403 *** 0.016 0.398 *** 0.016
0.491 *** 0.014 0.517 *** 0.014 0.495 *** 0.014 0.498 *** 0.014
Other


























Notes: The table reports the estimates of the following model: 
t i t i t t i t i t t i e CR F R E R , 0 , , , 1 , ' ] [ + + + = − η β     (13) 
t i i t i CR 0 , 0 , , γ β β + =         ( 1 4 )  
The table reports the average contagion and interdependence coefficients across all portfolios in the sample. Results 
for “Post-Lehman” are based on a definition of the crisis (CRt=1) for the period after the Lehman Brothers collapse, 
i.e. 15 September 2008 – 15 March 2009. “LTCM” crisis takes the period after the collapse of LTCM, from October 
through December 1998 as the crisis definition, while “TMT bust” defines the decline of global equity markets from 
October 2000 through December 2002. For these last two estimations, the current crisis observations are excluded. 
The model is estimated allowing for errors to be clustered by country. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 42
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Table 10: Channels of Interdependence 
coef std. err. Interdecile
Global channel
Financal depth -0.020 * 0.011 -0.021
Trade integration 0.181 *** 0.028 0.226
Credit risk - TED spread 0.073 *** 0.019 0.062
US  channel
Trade integration 0.173 *** 0.021 0.216
Current account -0.381 *** 0.061 -0.069
Credit risk - TED spread 0.220 *** 0.016 0.187
Domestic  channel
Trade integration -0.003 0.004 -0.003
Financial depth 0.257 *** 0.016 0.320
Financial integration -0.071 *** 0.008 -0.059
Credit risk - TED spread 0.359 *** 0.010 0.306
Test statistics
Full Sample
   ECTEST 21.69
   EXCOR 0.06
   ECDIAG 385.36
Crisis Period
   ECTEST 2.19
   EXCOR 0.04







Notes: The table shows the estimates of the following model: 
t i t t i t i t t i e F R E R , , , 1 , ' ] [ + + = − β     ( 1 ’ )  
k t i i t i Z − + = , 1 0 , , ' β β β         ( 2 ’ )  
We report the β1 coefficients, which are the coefficients on the Zi,t instruments that survive the encompassing 
approach of variable selection described in the text. This means that a variable is kept in the model only if its 
coefficient is statistically significant at the 15% level. The column labeled “interdecile” shows the difference in the 
respective interdependence coefficients for a portfolio with the determinant at its 90
th percentile compared to a 
portfolio at its 10
th percentile. The critical value of a Ȥ 
2 (1)-distributed variable is 3.84 (6.63) at the 5% (1%) level. 
The standard errors are clustered by country. ***, **, and*,indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10%levels, respectively. 43
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Table 11: Channels of Contagion and Interdependence 
coef std. err. Interdec. coef std. err. Interdecile
Global channel
Trade integration global 0.120 0.284 0.150 0.167 *** 0.051 0.209
Current account -1.429 ** 0.686 -0.239 -0.193 0.120 -0.032
Debt guarantees -0.366 * 0.191 -0.366
Deposit guarantees -0.327 * 0.196 -0.327
Risk aversion - VIX -0.846 *** 0.222 -0.159 0.515 *** 0.084 0.097
Credit risk - TED spread -0.878 *** 0.097 -0.749 0.787 *** 0.092 0.671
US  channel
Trade integration global -0.182 0.181 -0.227 0.274 *** 0.032 0.341
Financial integration global -0.711 *** 0.121 -0.591 -0.015 0.017 -0.013
Sovereign rating -0.596 ** 0.283 -0.596 -0.228 0.512 -0.228
Debt guarantees -0.251 ** 0.120 -0.251
Credit risk - TED spread -0.515 *** 0.059 -0.440 0.646 *** 0.051 0.551
Domestic  channel
Trade integration global -0.045 0.138 -0.056 0.252 *** 0.021 0.315
FX reserves -0.391 *** 0.161 -0.113 0.398 *** 0.058 0.115
Current account -1.021 ** 0.470 -0.171 -0.155 *** 0.060 -0.026
Deposit guarantees -0.444 *** 0.169 -0.444
Credit risk - TED spread -0.472 *** 0.034 -0.403 0.485 *** 0.029 0.414
Test statistics
Full Sample
   ECTEST 15.90
   EXCOR 0.05
   ECDIAG 420.47
Crisis Period
   ECTEST 0.01
   EXCOR 0.01







Notes: The table shows the estimates for the contagion parameters γ and the interdependence parameters β from the 
full model (1)-(4), following the encompassing approach of variable selection described in the text. This means that 
a variable is kept in the model if either the interdependence coefficient or the contagion parameter of a particular 
variable is statistically significant. The column labeled “Interdecile” shows the difference in the respective 
interdependence and contagion coefficients for a portfolio with the determinant at its 90
th percentile compared a 
portfolio at its 10
th percentile. The critical value of a Ȥ 
2 (1)-distributed variable is 3.84 (6.63) at the 5% (1%) level. 
The standard errors are clustered by country. ***, **, and *, indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10%,levels, respectively. 44
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Appendix
Appendix A.  Equity market data and a few stylized facts 
 
This Appendix outlines the equity market data coverage and definitions and presents a few stylized facts. 
As the objective is to test for the global transmission of the financial crisis, we use a broad set of 55 
countries (other than the United States, which are not included in our analysis of cross-country 
transmission patterns) that includes not only most of the advanced economies, but also emerging market 
economies (EMEs) and a few developing countries. Table A.1 lists the country coverage by region. The 
objective of analyzing the global transmission of the crisis implies that we would like to include stocks of 
firms that are traded frequently and for which also data on firm-specific characteristics are available. 
Hence we include only those firms in the analysis that are part of the main equity market index in the 
respective country, as shown in Table A.1. This comprises about 2,000 firms in total, for which we have 





From the firm-level data we construct country-sector portfolios, using the Bloomberg classification that 
allocates firms into 10 broad industry sectors. This yields in total 415 country-industry or country-sector 
portfolios. Not every of the 55 countries in the sample has therefore 10 country-sector portfolios as not all 
countries have firms in each of the 10 sectors in their main stock market index. These portfolios are 
value-weighted, so that each firm is weighted according to its relative market capitalization in its 
respective portfolio. While the number of firms included in a portfolio can be small (and indeed, for some 
of the smallest countries with a low number of listed firms, a single firm may represent an entire sector), 
our intention is to include only relatively large firms in each country that are traded frequently and for 
which we have reliable data. 
 
As to the current financial crisis, we define the starting point of the crisis as August 7, 2007, when equity 
markets initially fell and central banks started intervening for the first time to provide liquidity to 
financial markets. The last observation in our dataset is 15 March 2009. An alternative crisis definition is 
to start with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, which we investigate as a 
robustness check. Using our data to compute world market returns, the crisis meant an equity market 
decline of about 50% from peak to trough, occurring in about 18 months (from mid-2007 to early 2009). 
 
Appendix B.  Portfolio-specific determinants 
 
In addition to the country-specific and common/global instruments outlined in section 2, we control for a 
number of portfolio-specific determinants of crisis vulnerability. Specifically, we are interested in 
capturing two potential channels: financial constraints and external exposures at the firm level. There is a 
large literature in monetary economics and in finance on how to measure the degree of financial 
constraints faced by firms (Kaplan & Zingales 1997; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Cleary 1999; Almeida et 
al. 2004; Whited & Wu 2006). We follow the approach used by Whited and Wu (2006) and define 
financial constraints of a particular firm in the following way: 
 
t i t i t i t i t i t i t i FG IG A DA DD CF FC , , , , , , , 035 . 0 10 . 0 ln 044 . 0 02 . 0 062 . 0 09 . 0 − + − + − − =    (A.1) 
 
with CF as the cash flow-net asset ratio, DD a firm’s dividend payments, DA the debt-net assets ratio, A 
total net assets, IG industry growth rate, and FG as the firm’s growth rate in net assets. 
 
                                                 
10 The perspective of the analysis is therefore from the perspective of a US investor. Note that equity returns in US 
dollar terms have been even more negative during the crisis given that almost all currencies (bar the Japanese yen, 
and a few pegged currencies) depreciated against the US dollar; see Fratzscher (2009). 45
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Turning to proxies of firm-level external exposure, the exchange rate exposure of firms has been stressed 
in the literature as an important reason for why firms’ equity valuations are affected by foreign shocks 
(e.g. Adler and Dumas 1984, Dominguez and Tesar 2001 and 2006). The rationale is as follows: a firm is 
likely to be more strongly affected by a particular US shock and the resulting exchange rate change if it 
has a high external exposure, e.g. via trade or via external financial linkages. Following the methodology 
proposed by Dominguez and Tesar (2001), we proxy the exchange rate exposure of each portfolio to the 
United States by the sensitivity of its excess equity return at time t, Ri,t, to bilateral exchange rate changes 
vis-à-vis the US dollar, Δsi,t, controlling in the estimation also for US equity returns 
US




t i t i i t i e R s R , , 0 , + + Δ + = κ δ δ                  (A.2) 
 
where the exchange rate exposure for each portfolio, estimated over the whole pre-crisis sample period 1 
January 1995 to 6 August 2007, is measured as δi. For the estimation we use weekly data.  
Another type of exposure, and one related closely to the credit channel, is a firm’s exposure to changes in 
the cost of financing. Similar to the estimation proposed by Ammer, Vega and Wongswan (2009), we 
measure this channel as the interest rate exposure of individual portfolios to changes in domestic three-




t i t i i t i e R r R , , 0 , + + Δ + = κ ϕ η                  (A.3) 
 
using weekly data, in order to obtain portfolio-specific interest rate exposures ϕi. Unfortunately, short-
term interest rates at weekly frequencies are not available for all countries so that the sample size is more 
limited for this interest rate exposure variable.  
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 Table A.1: Country sample and equity indices 








Australia S&P ASX 30 Bulgaria SOFIX 20
Austria ATX 20 Croatia CROBEX 28
Belgium BEL20 20 Czech Republic PSE 14
Canada S&P TSE 60 60 Estonia OMX 18
Denmark OMX20 20 Hungary BSE 14
Finland OMX25 25 Iceland OMX ICEX 11
France CAC 40 40 Latvia OMX  35
Germany DAX 30 Lithuania OMX 32
Ireland ISEQ 60 Norway OBX 24
Italy MIB 30 30 Poland WIG 20 20
Japan Topix 70 70 Romania BET 10
Luxembourg LuxX 9 Russia MICEX 30
Netherlands AEX 25 Serbia Belex 15 15
Portugal PSI 20 20 Turkey  ISE National 30 30
Slovenia SBI20 15 Ukraine PFTS 19
Spain IBEX 35 35
Sweden OMX 30 30
Switzerland SMI 30 20
UK Footsie 100 100 Egypt CASE 30
Israel Tel Aviv-25 25
Lebanon BLOM 19
Tunisia SE BVMT 32
UAE DFM 29
China Shanghai SE 50 50
Hong Kong  Hang Seng  42
India BSE Sensex 30 30
Indonesia Jakarta LQ-45 45 Argentina Merval 22
Korea Kospi 50 50 Brazil Bovespa 66
New Zealand NZX 15 15 Chile IPSA 40
Singapore Strait Times 30 Colombia IGBC General 28
Taiwan TSEC Taiwan 50 50 Mexico Bolsa 36







Notes: The 10 broad industry sectors taken from Bloomberg’s classification used to create the market-weighted 
country-sector equity portfolios are: (i) basic materials, (ii) communications, (iii) consumer cyclical goods, (iv) 
consumer non-cyclical goods, (v) diversified, (vi) energy, (vii) financials, (viii) industrial, (ix) technology and (x) 
utilities. For the US, the stock index used is the S&P 500. 
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